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A PROJECTED GRADIENT DYNAMICAL SYSTEM MODELING THE
DYNAMICS OF BARGAINING
D. PINHEIRO, A. A. PINTO, S. Z. XANTHOPOULOS, AND A. N. YANNACOPOULOS
Abstract. We propose a projected gradient dynamical system as a model for a bargaining
scheme for an asset for which the two interested agents have personal valuations which do not
initially coincide. The personal valuations are formed using subjective beliefs concerning the
future states of the world and the reservation prices are calculated using expected utility theory.
The agents are not rigid concerning their subjective probabilities and are willing to update them
under the pressure to reach finally an agreement concerning the asset. The proposed projected
dynamical system, on the space of probability measures, provides a model for the evolution of
the agents beliefs during the bargaining period and is constructed so that agreement is reached
under the minimum possible deviation of both agents from their initial beliefs. The convergence
results are shown using techniques from convex dynamics and Lyapunov function theory.
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1. Introduction
Projected dynamical systems have attracted a lot of attention from the dynamical systems
community recently, as they present a lot of interesting features both from the theoretical point
of view, as well as from the point of view of applications. Such applications are mainly related
to optimization theory in the form of gradient schemes for the solution of convex optimization
problems. However, there are also important related applications to variational inequalities,
general equilibrium theory, population dynamics and mechanics, among others. Most of the
theory has been developed for continuous time dynamical systems [15, 14]. The aim of the
present paper is twofold: (a) to investigate a novel application of projected dynamical systems
into the theory of bargaining, and using that as a motivation (b) to investigate the theory
of projected dynamical systems in the case of discrete-time dynamics. We believe that the
application is interesting and wide enough to be studied in its own right. On the other hand,
the results in this paper concerning stability and convergence of projected dynamical systems
are general enough to apply to a wide range of similar dynamical systems arising in different
applications or as numerical schemes for continuous time projected dynamical systems, and thus
in our opinion worthy of reporting.
Bargaining theory is a branch of game theory that plays an important roˆle in various ap-
plications in economic theory. Quoting Muthoo [11] “a bargaining situation is a situation in
which two players1 have a common interest to co-operate. To put it differently, the players can
mutually benefit from reaching agreement on an outcome from a set of possible outcomes (that
contains two or more elements), but have conflicting interests over the set of outcomes.” This
is evidently a rather general description, under which a great variety of situations fall, and it
is quite understandable that bargaining theory has become rather popular as a tool for eco-
nomic modeling. To mention just a few applications, bargaining theory has found applications
in diverse fields such as modeling of trade union negotiations, negotiations between countries,
optimal asset ownership in firms, moral hazard in teams, bilateral monopoly, market games,
1A “player” can be either an individual, or an organization (such as a firm, or a country).
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among others, see e.g. [11] and the extensive list of references both from the point of view of
theoretical development of the subjects as well as from the point of view of applications.
One of the first seminal contributions in the field came from the work of Nash [12] who
proposed an axiomatic approach to the problem of bargaining based on the maximization of
the product of utility functions of the two players (agents) involved. His approach was a static
one, but opened the road for the embedding of bargaining problems within the body of game
theory, and provided important insights on the processes and variables that play on important
roˆle on the agents’ decisions. His work made an impact, and generated a lot of important
scientific research on the field, as well as alternative axiomatic approaches (see e.g. [7]). Another
seminal contribution was Rubinstein’s model [13] which undertook a more realistic approach
towards the bargaining problem. This was an alternating offers model, according to which the
two agents were considering alternate offers in splitting an asset comparing them against their
reservation quantities. This is a dynamic game in which discounting plays an important role
for its resolution; it is the effect of discounting that leads the agents into accepting an offer in
the long run, so that the game terminates in finite time. The ability of the agents to wait was
related to the bargaining power of the agents, the agent that can wait longer (has lower discount
factor) has a stronger bargaining position than the other. Furthermore, in the appropriate limit,
the Rubinstein model leads to the Nash bargaining solution, a remarkable fact that may lead
to considering the Rubinstein model as a strategic justification for the Nash bargaining model.
This is the limit as the absolute magnitudes of the frictions in the bargaining process are small.
In turn, the Rubinstein model has ignited a large strand of important literature on bargaining,
dealing with the evolution of the bargaining process both in theory and in applications (see e.g.
[11]).
In this paper we propose an alternative model for bargaining, based on the theory of projected
gradient dynamical systems, for the determination of the price of a contingent asset whose real
value depends on the future state of the economy. We assume that the two agents have their
personal valuations of the asset in terms of reservation prices determined by subjective expected
utility functions calculated under different probability measures concerning the economy. The
agents are not strict concerning the probability of the future states of the world and are willing
to update their beliefs on this matter, in an alternating fashion so that agreement is reached
within a chosen time horizon. This is not an unreasonable assumption, as the agents may be
assumed to derive some sort of information about their opponents beliefs from the offers they
make concerning the reservation price of the asset. The update of beliefs is made in such a
way that the agents deviate as small as possible from their initial beliefs, at each play of the
game, while the update is made so that the new reservation prices are now closer to reaching
agreement. This setup models the above quote from Muthoo according to which the two agents
have common interest to cooperate.
The strategy space for the game is the space of probability measures on the future state
of the economy. On account of that, the mechanism of the game is expressed as a projected
gradient dynamical system in the space of discrete measures. This is related to a minimization
problem – that of minimizing a function modeling the joint deviation of the two agents new
probability measures (beliefs) from their initial probability measures concerning the future state
of the economy. Using techniques from convex dynamics and Lyapunov functions, we show that
this projected gradient dynamical system converges to a fixed point in the space of measures
which in turn provides a unique common price for the asset.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the setup we will work on through-
out the paper and formulate the bargaining scheme as a minimization problem, identifying its
dual problem and possible alternative formulations as a penalty methods. In section 3 we discuss
the convexity properties of the reservation prices of the buyer and the seller of the contingent
claim and provide conditions for the minimization problem introduced in the previous section to
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have unique solutions. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of a class of discrete-time projected
dynamical systems modeling the bargaining scheme as a sequence of “small steps”, each given
by an iteration of a projected dynamical system which is related to a gradient scheme associated
with a penalized optimization problem introduced in section 2. Namely, we study the robustness
and stability of a general class of discrete-time projected dynamical systems, and then apply
these general results to the family of dynamical systems modeling the agents bargaining process.
In section 5, we restrict ourselves to the interesting case where the two agents involved in the
trade make their decisions using exponential utility functions. Such utility functions satisfy the
usual Inada conditions under which the results of the preceding sections were proved, providing
a clear example and strong motivation for such results.
2. Problem formulation
Consider two agents, agent A being the seller of a (contingent) claim and agent B the buyer.
The payoff of the claim depends on the future state of the economy, ωk, k = 1, · · · ,K, and is
considered as a random variable F defined on (Ω,F) where Ω is the set of states of the world
and F a σ-algebra on Ω. We allow the two agents to have subjective beliefs concerning the
future states of the world which are in principle different, and are modeled by two probability
measures QA and QB, on (Ω,F) respectively. The beliefs of the agents Qβ, β = A,B, determine
their views concerning the value of the claim F , therefore determine the bid and the ask price
respectively for F . We assume that the agents are not firm regarding their beliefs Qβ and are
willing to update them as part of a bargaining scheme whereby they exchange beliefs and reach
an agreement on the price of the asset.
This situation is common in various situations in economics. For instance one may consider
the case where F is a financial asset e.g. a derivative asset in an incomplete market. Then,
the use of the underlying financial market does not dictate the existence of a unique measure
which is defined by general equilibrium arguments (Arrow-Debreu measure) and which acts at
the common belief for both agents (as would happen in the case of complete markets) and
subjective beliefs of the agents as well as personal tastes with respect to risk enter the decision
process. Our approach is even more relevant in other cases; e.g. in cases where an asset is
traded outside the market or in bilateral agreements such as mergers and acquisitions where
subjectivity plays a very important role in the determination of the price.
We assume that the agents use utility pricing considerations to specify the price of the asset to
be traded. In particular, both agents report an expected utility EQβ [Uβ] under their subjective
probability measures Qβ, β = A,B. The utility functions Uβ : R → R satisfy the usual Inada
conditions [6], that is, the utility functions have value zero when x = 0, are strictly increasing,
strictly concave and continuously differentiable, and their first derivatives satisfy the following
asymptotic conditions
lim
x→−∞
U ′β(x) = +∞ , lim
x→+∞
U ′β(x) = 0 , β = A,B .
The reservation price Pβ for agent β is given by the solution of the following equation
Uβ(wβ)− rβ = EQβ [Uβ(wβ + ℓβPβ − ℓβF )] , (2.1)
where ℓA = 1 and ℓB = −1. In the above equation wβ ∈ R is the initial wealth of agent β,
considered to be fixed and deterministic, and rβ ∈ Rβ ⊆ R
+
0 can be considered to be the level
of risk undertaken by agent β. If rβ is zero then we are back to the standard reservation price
whereas if rβ is positive, we model the situation where agent β is willing to go below her initial
utility level so that the transaction is made possible. The introduction of rβ can also model the
fact that the utility function may not be known exactly and can even be a random utility. The
asymmetry between A and B introduced by ℓβ is due to the opposite position undertaken by
the two agents on the asset to be traded. Therefore an alternative interpretation of rβ can be
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as a measure of how much agent A (B) is willing to lower (raise) her reservation price so that
they both agree upon an acceptable price for F . We wish however to stress the fact that the
proposed bargaining dynamics do not depend on the introduction of the term rβ, which can be
taken without loss of generality to be equal to zero 2. In general, the reservation prices Pβ will
depend on Qβ and rβ, i.e., Pβ := Pβ(rβ , Qβ).
We now propose a bargaining scheme between the two agents. We suppose that throughout
the bargaining period each agent β keeps the level of risk rβ fixed. Assume that the transaction
takes place on a fixed interval [0, T ] and the agents report reservation prices Pβ(t) at discrete
times t ∈ N. At time t = 0 the two agents state their reservation prices Pβ(0) according to their
initial beliefs Qβ(0), β = A,B. Assume that these initial beliefs are such that PA(0) > PB(0),
therefore the two agents do not agree on a transaction for the exchange of the asset F . As the
beliefs of the agents concerning future states of the world are not firm, they are both willing to
review their subjective probabilities (beliefs) Qβ so as to reach a new reservation price, hoping
to reach an agreement. Then, for each instant of time t ∈ N, agent β (β = A,B) adopts the
set of beliefs Qβ(t) and states her reservation price Pβ(t) as the solution of equation (2.1) with
Qβ replaced by Qβ(t). A transaction takes place at time t if and only if PA(t) ≤ PB(t). By the
monotonicity properties of the utility functions UA and UB one can easily see that the above
constraint is binding and therefore we will only consider the case PA(t) = PB(t).
The update of subjective probabilities of the agents each period is done in such a manner
that given rβ (possibly 0) the reservation prices should eventually converge, therefore the two
agents are expected to update their beliefs until reaching some set of beliefs Q∗A and Q
∗
B for
which the corresponding reservation prices are such that the equality PA(rA, Q
∗
A) = PB(rB , Q
∗
B)
is satisfied and trade takes place. The agents are willing to deviate as little as possible from
their original beliefs [4] therefore it is natural to assume that (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) is as close as possible
to (QA(0), QB(0)). This remark indicates that the choice of (Q
∗
A, Q
∗
B) can be obtained as the
solution of a properly chosen optimization problem. This optimization problem will also lead us
to a dynamical theory of bargaining.
Let ∆K be the unit simplex in RK and let D = ∆K ×∆K be the state space for the agents
beliefs. The distance of a subjective probability measure Qβ from the reference measure Qβ(0)
is modeled by a strictly convex function ψβ : ∆
K ×∆K → R+, such that ψ(x, x) = 0. The value
of the function ψβ(Qβ, Qβ(0)) models how agent β evaluates the distance of the new subjective
probability measure Qβ from the original belief Qβ(0). The smaller this value the more willing
is agent β to adopt the new subjective probability measure Qβ in place of her original choice
Qβ(0). Of course if it were not for the need to change Qβ to get closer to an agreement in price,
the agent would stick to her original choice. The agents do not decide on their own, they have
to take into account the beliefs of each other. Therefore, in reaching a common agreement the
unwillingness of both to deviate too much from their original subjective probabilities should be
taken into account. This may be modeled by the convex combination
λψA(QA, QA(0)) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , QB(0))
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a real parameter that models which agent is allowed to deviate less from her
original subjective probability. If λ = 0 then agent B has the dominant role in this transaction
as it is only her unwillingness to deviate from original beliefs that is taken into account, whereas
no respect for agent A feelings towards this matter is paid. If λ = 1 the opposite happens.
Any other choice of λ ∈ (0, 1) corresponds to “sharing” the discontent caused by the change of
subjective probability measure between the two agents. Therefore, in some respect λ may be
thought of as a relative measure of “bargaining power” of two agents.
2 This will correspond to the case where no misspecification of utility is allowed in the model.
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Therefore, according to the above discussion, for some fixed levels of risk rA and rB , we define
the optimal beliefs (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D as the solution to the following minimization problem
min
(QA,QB)∈D
λψA(QA, QA(0)) + (1− λ)ψB(QB, QB(0))
subject to (2.2)
PA(rA, QA) ≤ PB(rB , QB).
Resorting to an analogy between the optimization problem (2.2) and the classical utility
maximization problem [10, Ch. 3], it is possible to check that the dual problem of (2.2) can be
written as
max
(QA,QB)∈D
PB(rB , QB)− PA(rA, QA)
subject to (2.3)
λψA(QA, QA(0)) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , QB(0)) ≤ β.
Note that the dual problem (2.3) corresponds to maximizing the difference of the reservation
prices by the buyer and by the seller, thus ensuring the trade of the contingent claim, under
the constraint that the agents beliefs do not change more than a fixed value as measured by
the functions ψA and ψB [4]. As is well known, duality implies that the solutions of the two
problems above are intimately related. See Bertsekas textbook [3] for further details on nonlinear
optimization and duality.
In section 4 we will address the minimization problem (2.2) using a projected gradient scheme
associated with a couple of penalized optimization problems. The first such problem is of the
form
min
(QA,QB)∈D
λψA(QA, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B) +
1
ǫ
Φ(PB(rB , QB)− PA(rA, QA)) ,
where Φ : R → R is a strictly convex function with a (global) minimum Φ(0) and ǫ is a small
parameter. The second penalized optimization problem is of the form
min
(QA,QB)∈D
λψA(QA, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B)
+
1
ǫ
Φ
[
PB(rB , QB)− λPA(rA, Q
0
A)− (1− λ)PB(rB , Q
0
B)
]
+
1
ǫ
Φ
[
λPA(rA, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)PB(rB , Q
0
B)− PA(rA, QA)
]
,
where Φ and ǫ are as described above.
By taking the gradient of the functionals to be minimized and projecting it to the space of
discrete probability measures in a appropriate way, the two penalized optimization problems
above enable us to define discrete-time dynamical systems which, under appropriate conditions,
model the bargaining process under which the two agents agree on a unique price to trade the
contingent claim F . We note that such projected gradient dynamical systems can be idealized
as a repetition in time of the above optimization problems, with the agents β choosing the
subjective probability Qβ(t+ 1) so as to get closer to an agreement in reservation prices but at
the same time with the minimum possible common deviation from their initial beliefs Qβ(0).
Remark We remark that 1/ǫ can be thought of as a discount factor in the model, that is, a
factor modeling the degree of impatience for the agents to reach an agreement. The smaller
ǫ is, the more impatient the agents are, and this in some sense characterizes the time for an
agreement to be reached. Note that discounting plays a very important role in bargaining models
in general, e.g. [11] and references therein.
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Even though the two penalized optimization problems above share the same form, i.e. a sum
of a convex linear combination of “distance functions” with a penalty term, the differences in
their penalty terms (dependence on λ and past beliefs) provide very distinct dynamical behaviors
for the corresponding projected gradient systems. We will provide a detailed description of such
dynamics in section 4.
3. Preliminary results on reservation prices and the optimization problem
We will devote the beginning of this section to an analysis of several properties of the agents
reservation price functions. We will then use these properties to provide conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of solutions to the minimization problem (2.2) where one looks for
optimal beliefs for fixed levels of risks.
3.1. Reservation price functions properties. In this section we provide a detailed analysis
of the agents reservation price functions properties. We prove that such functions are well-
defined before moving on to list some of its convexity properties. We end this section with
results concerning the regularity of these functions.
The standing assumption throughout this section is that the utility functions of the agents
Uβ satisfy the Inada conditions. To ease notation we define
L(QA, QB ; Q
0
A, Q
0
B , λ) := λψA(QA, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B) (3.1)
which is considered as a function of (QA, AB) ∈ D, the terms after the semicolon considered as
parameters. We will also use the notation ℓA = 1 and ℓB = −1.
Lemma 3.1. The following hold for the agents reservation prices:
(1) The functions Pβ : R
+
0 ×∆
K → R are well defined.
(2) The functions ℓβPβ are convex functions of rβ ∈ R
+
0 for fixed beliefs Qβ ∈ ∆
K .
(3) The functions ℓβPβ are concave functions of Qβ ∈ ∆
K for fixed values of rβ ∈ R
+
0 ;
The proof of this lemma is technical and is included in the Appendix.
A consequence of lemma 3.1 and is the key fact that when taken as functions of both the
agents risk levels and the agents beliefs, the reservation prices PA and PB are neither concave,
nor convex, limiting the array of techniques available to address an eventual problem where both
a convex linear combinations of the agents levels of risk and the functional in (2.2) were to be
jointly minimized.
We now provide results concerning boundedness and differentiability of the reservation price
functions. We start by proving that the agents reservation prices are differentiable with respect
to their beliefs and risk levels, computing also the corresponding partial derivatives.
Lemma 3.2. There exists an open neighborhood of R+0 ×∆
K where Pβ are continuously differ-
entiable with partial derivatives given by
∂Pβ
∂Qkβ
(rβ , Qβ) = −ℓβ
Uβ(wβ + ℓβPA − ℓβF [k])
EQβ [U
′
β(wβ + ℓβPA − ℓβF )]
, k = 1, . . . ,K
∂Pβ
∂rβ
(rβ , Qβ) = −ℓβ
1
EQβ [U
′
β(wβ + ℓβPβ − ℓβF )]
Proof. We prove the statement for the price function of agent A, the proof for agent B being
similar. Recall from the proof of lemma 3.1 that the expected utility function of agent A for the
contingent claim F , UA is a strictly increasing concave function of x. Since UA is a convex linear
combination of differentiable functions, it is also differentiable. We obtain that the expected
utility UA is invertible with differentiable inverse. The result then follows by the implicit function
theorem, the expressions for the partial derivatives of PA with respect to the components of QA
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being obtained through implicit differentiation of (A.1) and similarly for the partial derivative
of PA with respect to rA. 
Remark We note that:
(i) The knowledge of the partial derivatives of the price functions restricted to R+ × ∆K
provides us with information regarding the sensitivity of the price functions with respect
to changes in the agents beliefs and levels of risk which is a key ingredient for the setup
of the projected dynamical systems of section 4.
(ii) Since the utility functions derivatives U ′A and U
′
B are strictly positive, we obtain that
the reservation price of the seller PA is a decreasing function of the amount of risk rA
undertaken by the seller of the contingent claim and, similarly, the reservation price of
the buyer PB is an increasing function of the amount of risk rB undertaken by the buyer.
(iii) The equalities
∂PA
∂QkA
(rA, QA) = UA(wA + PA − F [k])
∂PA
∂rA
(rA, QA) , k = 1, . . . ,K
∂PB
∂QkB
(rB , QB) = UB(wB + PB − F [k])
∂PB
∂rB
(rB , QB) , k = 1, . . . ,K
provide us with an alternative interpretation for the update of beliefs under fixed levels
of risk: the sensitivity of the agents price functions to such changes is proportional to
the sensitiveness of the agents price to changes in their risk levels under a fixed set of
beliefs, the proportionality constant being given by the utility level in the corresponding
state of the world.
The next result provides upper and lower bounds for the reservation prices of the seller and
the buyer of the contingent claim as well as a criteria for the existence of beliefs QA and QB
and levels of risk rA and rB under which the two agents agree on the price for the contingent
claim.
Lemma 3.3. Let us introduce the notation F = max
ω∈Ω
F [ω] and F = min
ω∈Ω
F [ω].
The reservation prices satisfy the inequalities
U−1A (UA(wA)− rA)− wA + F ≤ PA ≤ U
−1
A (UA(wA)− rA)− wA + F
wB − U
−1
B (UB(wB)− rB) + F ≤ PB ≤ wB − U
−1
B (UB(wB)− rB) + F .
Moreover, there exist QA, QB ∈ int(∆
K) and rA, rB ∈ R
+
0 such that PA(rA, QA) = PB(rB , QB)
if and only if the following condition holds
F − F > wB − U
−1
B (UB(wB)− rB) + wA − U
−1
A (UA(wA)− rA) . (3.2)
The proof is given in Appendix B
Remark
(i) The proof of the previous lemma also ensures that inequality (3.2) holds if there exist
some QA, QB ∈ ∆
K such that PA(rA, QA) > PB(rB , QB).
(ii) The right hand side of inequality (3.2) tends to zero as rA, rB → 0 or wA, wB → +∞,
making this a trivial condition in these cases. Moreover, we note that
sup
QA∈∆K
PA(rA, QA) ≤ sup
QB∈∆K
PB(rB , QB)
inf
QA∈∆K
PA(rA, QA) ≤ inf
QB∈∆K
PB(rB , QB) ,
the inequalities above being a consequence of the non-negative levels of risk rA and rB
undertaken by the agents. In particular, positive levels of risk lead to an higher upper
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bound for the buyer reservation price and a smaller lower bound for the seller reservation
price.
(iii) As a consequence of the previous lemma we obtain that for the agents to agree on
a unique price for the contingent, their wealths and levels of risk must satisfy some
boundedness conditions. In particular if inequality (3.2) is satisfied, we have that the
agents levels of risk are such that rβ ∈ Rβ where Rβ, β = A,B are bounded sets. The
result follows easily from the observation that the right hand side of inequality (3.2) is
an increasing function of rβ, therefore Rβ ⊆ R
+
0 must be also bounded above.
A final result to conclude this section concerns the regularity of the price functions derivatives
with respect to the beliefs of the agents under some mild additional assumptions on the agents
utility functions, wealth and levels or risk.
Lemma 3.4. Assume U ′β are Lipschitz continuous functions and that rβ ∈ Rβ where Rβ is a
bounded subset of R+0 . Then, the partial derivatives of the price functions Pβ with respect to
(rβ , Qβ) are Lipschitz continuous on R
+
0 ×∆
K , for β = A,B.
The proof of the Lemma is given in Appendix C.
3.2. The minimization problem solvability and solution dependence on parameters.
In this section our focus lies on the minimization problem (2.2) concerning the choice of optimal
beliefs (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ ∆
K ×∆K for fixed fixed positive levels of risk rA and rB undertaken by the
two agents. The next theorem provides conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution
for such minimization problem.
Theorem 3.5. Assume that the agents initial beliefs Q0A, Q
0
B ∈ ∆
K are such that P (rA, Q
0
A) >
P (rB , Q
0
B) for fixed levels of risk rA, rB ∈ R
+
0 and wealths wA, wB ∈ R.
Then, for every weight λ ∈ (0, 1) the minimization problem (2.2) has a unique solution
(Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ ∆
K ×∆K providing a unique price
P ∗(rA, rB , λ) = PA(rA, Q
∗
A) = PB(rB , Q
∗
B)
for the transaction of the contingent claim.
Furthermore, the solution (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) depends continuously on the agents relative weight λ and
risk levels rA and rB.
The proof uses standard arguments is given in Appendix D for completeness.
The next result is a clear consequence of the previous theorem and duality theory for opti-
mization problems.
Corollary 3.6. Under the conditions of theorem 3.5, the (dual) maximization problem (2.3)
has a unique solution and at the optimal point (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ ∆
K ×∆K we have that
PB(rB , Q
∗
B)− PA(rA, Q
∗
A) = 0 .
Remark On account of the fact that the reservation prices Pβ are neither concave nor convex
as joint functions of the agents risks and beliefs the treatment of the “enlarged” optimization
problem
min
(rβ ,Qβ)∈(R
+
0
×∆K)2
λrA + (1− λ)rB + λψA(QA, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B)
subject to the constraint PA(rA, QA) ≤ PB(rB , QB) is not a straightforward issue and may not
lead to unique solutions.
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4. A projected gradient scheme in discrete time
In this section we introduce a discrete-time dynamical system modeling the bargaining process
under which the two agents update their beliefs in order to reach a common price for the
contingent claim to be traded. This dynamical system is defined as a projected gradient scheme
which approximates solutions of minimization problems of the same form as the minimization
problem (2.2). Its phase space is D := ∆K ×∆K and its iterates represent the evolution with
time of the pair of beliefs (QA(t), QB(t)), t ∈ N.
Suppose that at the initial time t = 0 the eventual seller and buyer of the contingent claim
have, respectively, initial beliefs QA(0), QB(0) ∈ ∆
K satisfying PA(rA, QA(0)) > PB(rB , QB(0)).
At each instant of time t ∈ N, the two agents update their beliefs from the probability mea-
sures (QA(t), QB(t)) ∈ D to new probability measures (QA(t + 1), QB(t + 1)) ∈ D using a
projected gradient scheme associated with the penalized unconstrained optimization problem
for the function
LP (QA, QB ;Q
0
A, Q
0
B , λ) := L(QA, QB ;Q
0
A, Q
0
B , λ) +
1
ǫ
Φ(PB(rB , QB)− PA(rA, QA)) (4.1)
where the penalty function Φ : R→ R is assumed to be a strictly convex continuously differen-
tiable function with a (global) minimum Φ(0) and ǫ is a small parameter measuring the size of
the penalty term. A simple example of a penalty function satisfying these conditions is provided
by the quadratic function Φ(x) = x2, but many other choices are equally suitable for the role of
penalty function, e.g. the logarithmic penalty function etc.
We will start by considering the unconstrained optimization problem
min
(QA,QB)∈D
LP (QA, QB ;Q
0
A, Q
0
B , λ) (4.2)
associated with the penalized functional (4.1) and studying the relation between its solutions
and the solutions of the minimization problem (2.2). Recall that theorem 3.5 provides conditions
under which the minimization problem (2.2) above has a unique solution yielding a common
price for the contingent claim. This also justifies the assumptions on the form of the penalty
function: it is zero on the codimension one set of beliefs where the two agents reservation prices
coincide, and it is positive where the two reservation prices are unequal, thus penalizing choices
of beliefs which do not lead to a unique price for the contingent claim. We will prove below that
under the conditions of theorem 3.5 there exists a small enough ǫ0 > 0 such that the penalized
problem (4.2) has also a unique solution for every ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0). Moreover, we also prove that the
unique solution of (4.2) depends continuously on ǫ and tends to the solution of (2.2) as ǫ → 0
for fixed initial beliefs (Q0A, Q
0
B) ∈ D.
The dynamical system modeling the bargaining process is then an iterative algorithm for
solving the minimization problem (2.2) by approximating the penalized problem (4.2) which
then approximates (2.2) for small values of ǫ. Let us introduce the notation
x(t) = (QA(t), QB(t)) ∈ D
and let LP : D
2 → R denote the functional (4.1), now expressed in terms of the variable x
as LP (x(t + 1), x(t)), where the semicolon notation as well as the explicit dependence on λ
are dropped for simplicity. The projected dynamical system on D modeling the bargaining
scheme for the agents to reach a unique price for the contingent claim is the implicitly defined
discrete-time dynamical system given by
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + α
(
ΠD
[
x(t)−∇x(t+1)LP (x(t+ 1), x(t))
]
− x(t)
)
, (4.3)
where ∇x(t+1)LP (x(t + 1), x(t)) ∈ R
2K denotes the gradient of LP with respect to the variable
x(t+ 1) and ΠD : R
2K → D is the projection operator onto D defined by
ΠD(x) = argmin
y∈D
‖x− y‖
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where ‖·‖ denotes the euclidean norm in R2K . We believe it is worth to remark that since “initial
beliefs” components are changed at each iteration, the dynamical system under consideration
does not typically lead to a solution of the optimization problems (4.2) or (2.2) in a single
iteration.
Remark We note that for x = (x1, . . . , xK , xK+1, . . . , x2K) ∈ D, the i-th component of the
projection of x onto D, (ΠD(x))i, is given by
(ΠD(x))i =
{
xi −
1
K
∑K
j=1 xj +
1
K
, i = 1, . . . ,K
xi −
1
K
∑2K
j=K+1 xj +
1
K
, i = K + 1, . . . , 2K .
(4.4)
In section 4.1 we provide conditions under which the minimization problem (4.2) has a unique
solution and characterize how such solution depends on the parameter ǫ. We devote section 4.2
to the study of general properties of a family of dynamical systems which includes (4.3) as a
particular case. We apply these results to the special case of (4.3) in section 4.3. In section 4.4
we consider a modification of (4.3) which has the key feature that the penalty function depends
on the relative bargaining power of the two agents λ.
4.1. Penalized optimization problem. Before moving on to the analysis of the qualitative
properties of the dynamical system defined by (4.3), we provide conditions ensuring the existence
and uniqueness of solutions for the penalized minimization problem (4.2). Note that even though
the functional to minimize in (4.2) may not be convex, we are still able to obtain uniqueness for
the solution of such problem, as stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that the agents initial beliefs are such that (Q0A, Q
0
B) ∈ D are such
that P (rA, Q
0
A) > P (rB , Q
0
B) for fixed levels of risk rA, rB ∈ R
+
0 and wealths wA, wB ∈ R.
There exists ǫ0 > 0 such that for every ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0) the optimization problem (4.2) has a unique
solution which depends continuously on ǫ. Moreover, this solution converges to the solution of
the original constrained problem (2.2) as ǫ→ 0.
Proof. The existence of a solution to (4.2) is clear. We deal only with the uniqueness of such
solution in this proof.
Since the agents initial beliefs Q0A, Q
0
B ∈ ∆
K are such that P (rA, Q
0
A) > P (rB , Q
0
B), then
inequality (3.2) holds and lemma 3.3 guarantees the existence of QA, QB ∈ ∆
K such that
PB(rB , QB) = PA(rA, QA). A straightforward consequence is that Φ(PB(rB , QB)−PA(rA, QA))
is not convex. In fact, Φ(PB(rB , QB)− PA(rA, QA)) is convex on the subset of D defined by
S = {(QA, QB) ∈ D : PB(rB , QB) ≥ PA(rA, QA)}
but this is no longer true on the complement of S on D. Before proceeding with the proof, we
introduce some notation. Let λ ∈ (0, 1), Q∗A ∈ ∆
K and Q∗B ∈ ∆
K be fixed but arbitrary, and
let Φ : D → R be given by
Φ(QA, QB) = Φ(PB(rB , QB)− PA(rA, QA)) ,
define Ψ : D → R as
Ψ(QA, QB) = λψA(QA, Q
∗
A) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , Q
∗
B) ,
and let LP : D → R be given by
LP (QA, QB) = Ψ(QA, QB) +
1
ǫ
Φ(QA, QB) . (4.5)
Since Ψ is a convex function in D, LP is of the form (4.5) and has at least one local minimum,
then there exists δ > 0 such that LP
−1
(0, δ) is a non-empty convex subset of D. Let us define
ǫ0 as
ǫ0 = sup
{
ǫ ∈ R+0 : ∇(QA,QB)LP 6= 0 for every (QA, QB) ∈ (D)\LP
−1
(0, δ)
}
.
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Note that ǫ0 is strictly positive since LP is continuously differentiable on D and non-constant,
and thus it must have at most a finite number of critical values on a compact set. Then, for
every ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0) the optimization problem (4.2) has a unique solution.
Berge’s maximum theorem [2, Ch. VI, Sec. 3] guarantees continuity of the optimal solution
with respect to ǫ. Using proposition 4.2.1 of [3] we conclude that the solution of (4.2) converges
to the solution of the original problem (2.2). 
Remark If we assume the functional to minimize in (4.2) to be at least twice differentiable with
respect to the updated beliefs (QA, QB), we could use the implicit function theorem to obtain a
generic condition under which the unique solution of (4.2) is differentiable with respect to ǫ on
a small neighborhood of the origin of the form (0, ǫ0), for some ǫ0 > 0.
4.2. Projected dynamical systems. We now consider a discrete-time projected dynamical
system implicitly3 defined by
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + α (ΠC [x(t)− βG(x(t+ 1), x(t))] − x(t)) , (4.6)
where α and β are such that 0 < α < 1 and β > 0, C is a convex compact subset of Rn,
G : C × C → Rn is a continuous function on C × C and ΠC : R
n → C is the projection operator
onto C defined by
ΠC(x) = argmin
y∈C
‖x− y‖ ,
where ‖·‖ denotes the euclidean norm in Rn. Furthermore, we assume that every point in C has
a unique forward orbit, i.e. there exists a map F : C → C such that
x(t+ 1) = F (x(t)) . (4.7)
In the case where ΠC [y − βG(x, y)] is a differentiable function, the assumption above reduces
to assuming that the inequality
det (Idn×n − αDxΠC [y − βG(x, y)]) 6= 0
holds for every x, y ∈ C, where Idn×n stands for the identity matrix in R
n and Dx denotes
differentiation with respect to x.
The next auxiliary result concerns invariance and stability of the convex set C under the
dynamics defined by (4.6).
Lemma 4.2. The following hold:
(i) C is invariant under the projected dynamical system (4.6).
(ii) If x0 /∈ C, the orbit through x0 of the projected dynamical system (4.6) converges exponentially
fast to C as t→∞.
Proof. (i) Let x(t) be an element of C and rewrite (4.6) as
x(t+ 1) = (1− α)x(t) + αΠC [x(t)− βG(x(t+ 1), x(t))] .
Since ΠC is a projection operator onto C, we get that x(t+ 1) is a convex linear combination of
two elements of C. Therefore, we conclude that x(t+ 1) ∈ C, proving invariance of C under the
dynamical system (4.6).
(ii) The continuous function V : Rn → R given by
V (x) = ‖x−ΠCx‖
2
3The proposed implicit scheme can be thought of as a backward Euler approximation of a continuous time gradient
flow. Similar results would hold for an explicit scheme which corresponds to a forward Euler approximation of a
continuous gradient flow, of course with the usual drawbacks of the forward Euler scheme inherited by the explicit
scheme. On the other hand, if we wish to assign a behavioral interpretation to the gradient scheme we may always
revert to the explicit scheme by a power series approximation of the implicit scheme.
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is a Lyapunov function [1] for the discrete time dynamical system (4.6). Note that V (x) = 0 for
every x ∈ C and that V (x) > 0 for every x /∈ C. It remains to check that V is strictly decreasing
on orbits of (4.6) through points not in C.
Take an arbitrary point x0 /∈ C and let {xn : n ∈ N} be the sequence of points in the forward
orbit of x0 by the dynamics of (4.6). We will prove that the quantity
∆V (n) := V (xn+1)− V (xn) = ‖xn+1 −ΠCxn+1‖
2 − ‖xn −ΠCxn‖
2 (4.8)
is negative for every n ∈ N. We first note that
xn+1 = (1− α)xn + αΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)] . (4.9)
Since ΠC is a projection operator, we get
ΠCxn+1 = ΠC [(1− α)xn + αΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]]
= (1− α)ΠCxn + αΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)] . (4.10)
Putting together (4.9) and (4.10), we conclude that
xn+1 −ΠCxn+1 = (1− α) (xn −ΠCxn) .
We now use the previous equality to obtain
‖xn+1 −ΠCxn+1‖
2 − ‖xn −ΠCxn‖
2 = ((1− α)2 − 1) ‖xn −ΠCxn‖
2 . (4.11)
Substituting (4.11) in (4.8) and recalling that 0 < α < 1, we get
V (xn+1)− V (xn) = ((1− α)
2 − 1) ‖xn −ΠCxn‖
2 < 0 ,
thus proving that orbits of (4.6) through points not in C converge to C exponentially fast. 
The next theorem ensures robustness of the dynamical system (4.6) under sufficiently small
perturbations.
Theorem 4.3. Assume that the map G : Rn × Rn → C given by G(x, y) = ΠC [y − βG(x, y)] is
differentiable. Then C is a normally hyperbolic invariant manifold for the projected dynamical
system (4.6).
Proof. Choose a local trivialization (x, y) ∈ ∪jMj × E, where ∪jMj is an open cover of the
convex compact set C and E is a Banach space measuring the displacement from C. Note that
in such coordinates, the set invariant set D is defined by the condition y = 0. Moreover, in the
local coordinates (x, y) the spectrum of the normal component must have all eigenvalues inside
the unity circle by lemma 4.2(ii). Using a partition of the unity argument one can prove that
this property is global, thus proving normal hyperbolicity of the set C. 
Using the previous theorem, we obtain that the dynamics of (4.6) are robust under sufficiently
small perturbations, i.e. any sufficiently close dynamical system still has a normally hyperbolic
invariant manifold which is close to C. Furthermore, if we assume that the perturbation preserves
the compact convex set C, we obtain that C is still a normally hyperbolic manifold for the
perturbed dynamics. This property ensures that in a neighborhood of the dynamical system
(4.6), the dynamics are qualitatively similar, providing robustness to the model under analysis.
The result below provides a characterization for the fixed points of the projected dynamical
system (4.6).
Proposition 4.4. The following statements hold:
(i) if G(x∗, x∗) = 0, then x∗ ∈ C is a fixed point of (4.6);
(ii) if x∗ ∈ int(C) is a fixed point of (4.6), then G(x∗, x∗) = 0.
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Proof. The proof of item (i) is trivial verification.
In what concerns the proof of item (ii), we recall that every fixed point x∗ ∈ C lies on the
non-empty subset S ⊂ C defined by
S = {x ∈ C : x = ΠC [x− βG(x, x)]} .
Since ΠC is a projection operator (see [8]) every x
∗ ∈ S must satisfy the inequality
〈x∗, η − x∗〉 ≥ 〈x∗ − βG(x∗, x∗), η − x∗〉
for every η ∈ C. Using the inner product linearity, we obtain that the inequality
〈G(x∗, x∗), η − x∗〉 ≥ 0
must be satisfied for every η ∈ C. We conclude that G(x∗, x∗) = 0 for every x∗ ∈ S ∩ int(C). 
The next theorem concerns the existence and stability of fixed points of (4.6).
Theorem 4.5. Let GD : C → C, GD(x) := G(F (x), x), (see (4.7)) be Lipschitz continuous.
Then, the projected dynamical system (4.6) has at least one fixed point which is stable in the
sense of Lyapunov for every α such that 0 < α < (1 + β2L2/2)−1, where L is the Lipschitz
constant of GD.
Proof. Using lemma 4.2 we obtain that C is invariant under the dynamics of (4.6). Moreover,
since C is convex and compact, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem ensures the existence of at least
one fixed point x∗ for the dynamical system (4.6). Note that by definition of the dynamical
system (4.6), every fixed point x∗ ∈ C lies on the non-empty subset S ⊂ C defined by
S = {x ∈ C : x = ΠC [x− βG(x, x)]} .
Take an arbitrary point x0 ∈ C and let {xn : n ∈ N} be the sequence of points in the forward
orbit of x0 by the dynamics of (4.6). We will now see that the sequence {xn}n∈N converges to
some point x∗ ∈ S. For that purpose, we will prove that V : C × C → R given by
V (x, y) = ‖y −ΠC [y − βG(x, y)]‖
2
is a Lyapunov function [1] for the discrete time dynamical system (4.6). We start by noting that
V (x∗, x∗) = 0 for every x∗ ∈ S. Moreover, we have that
V (xn+1, xn) = ‖xn −ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]‖
2
=
1
α2
‖xn+1 − xn‖
2 .
Therefore, we obtain that V (xn+1, xn) > 0 for every n ∈ N and every trajectory of (4.6) not
containing a fixed point x∗ ∈ S. It remains to check that V is strictly decreasing on orbits of
(4.6), i.e. we will prove that the variation
∆V (n) = V (xn+1, xn)− V (xn, xn−1)
is negative for every n ∈ N. Using the projected dynamical system (4.6) definition, we obtain
that
ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)] =
xn+1 − (1− α)xn
α
.
Using the previous identity, we get that
V (xn+1, xn) = ‖xn −ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]‖
2
=
1
α2
‖xn+1 − xn‖
2 .
In a similar fashion, we obtain that
V (xn, xn−1) =
1
α2
‖xn − xn−1‖
2 ,
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and thus, we get that
∆V (n) =
1
α2
(
‖xn+1 − xn‖
2 − ‖xn − xn−1‖
2
)
. (4.12)
Using (4.6) twice, we obtain
xn+1 − xn = (1− α)(xn − xn−1)
+α (ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]−ΠC [xn−1 − βG(xn, xn−1)]) . (4.13)
Combining (4.12) and (4.13) with the triangle inequality, we obtain the inequality
‖xn+1 − xn‖
2 − ‖xn − xn−1‖
2 ≤ −(1− (1− α)2) ‖xn − xn−1‖
2
+α2 ‖ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]−ΠC [xn−1 − βG(xn, xn−1)]‖
2
Therefore, we have that
∆V (n) ≤
(
1−
2
α
)
‖xn − xn−1‖
2
+ ‖ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]−ΠC [xn−1 − βG(xn, xn−1)]‖
2 . (4.14)
Noting that ΠC is a projection and using once more the triangle inequality, we get
‖ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]−ΠC [xn−1 − βG(xn, xn−1)]‖
2 ≤
‖xn − xn−1‖
2 + β2 ‖G(xn+1, xn)]−G(xn, xn−1)‖
2 .
Using the representation (4.7) for the projected dynamical system (4.6), we can write xn+1 =
F (xn) and xn = F (xn−1). Substituting into the previous inequality, we obtain
‖ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]−ΠC [xn−1 − βG(xn, xn−1)]‖
2 ≤
‖xn − xn−1‖
2 + β2 ‖G(F (xn), xn)]−G(F (xn−1), xn−1)‖
2 .
Since we assume G(F (x), x) to be L-Lipschitz continuous, we obtain the following estimate
‖ΠC [xn − βG(xn+1, xn)]−ΠC [xn−1 − βG(xn, xn−1)]‖
2 ≤ (1 + β2L2) ‖xn − xn−1‖
2 . (4.15)
Combining (4.14) with (4.15), we obtain
∆V (n) ≤
(
2 + β2L2 −
2
α
)
‖xn − xn−1‖
2
We conclude that for every α ∈ (0, (1 + β2L2/2)−1) we have that ∆V (n) < 0 for every n ∈ N.
Since this estimate does not depend on the initial point x0 ∈ C then, for every α in the interval
above, every trajectory of (4.6) must converge to some fixed point x∗ ∈ S. 
The next result is a natural consequence of the two previous results.
Corollary 4.6. Assume that the map G˜ : C → Rn, G˜(x) := G(x, x) is the gradient of a function
V with a unique minimum. Then, the projected dynamical system (4.6) converges to the unique
minimizer of V as t→ +∞.
We should note that the result above includes the cases of V being convex or quasi-convex
function since such functions have a unique minimum in every compact convex set (see [5,
9] for further details on generalizations of the concept of convexity and its consequences for
optimization theory)
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4.3. Bargaining dynamics for a λ-independent penalty function. We now return to the
analysis of the projected dynamical system (4.3) associated with the penalized optimization
scheme (4.2).
Lemma 4.7. The discrete-time dynamical system defined implicitly by (4.3) is well defined, i.e.
to every x0 ∈ D corresponds exactly one forward trajectory (xn)n∈N such that for every n ∈ N
the pair (xn, xn−1) satisfies the recurrence (4.3).
Proof. Consider the equation
y = (1− α)x+ α ΠD [x−∇1LP (y, x)] , (4.16)
where ∇1LP (y, x) denotes the gradient of LP (y, x) with respect to its first component y ∈ D.
Clearly, to prove the present lemma it is enough to show that for every x ∈ D, equation (4.16)
has a unique solution y ∈ D. Suppose this is not the case, i.e. there exists x ∈ D such that
equality (4.16) has two distinct solutions y1, y2 ∈ D. Using (4.16), we obtain immediately that
y1 − y2 = α
(
ΠD
[
x−∇1LP (y
1, x)
]
−ΠD
[
x−∇1LP (y
2, x)
])
.
Let us write x = (xA, xB), where xA = (xA1 , . . . , xAK ) ∈ ∆
K and xB = (xB1 , . . . , xBK ) ∈ ∆
K ,
and similarly for y1, y2. Combining the previous equality with the definition of the projection
operator ΠD : R
2K → D given in (4.4), we get that
(K − 1)DAi −
K∑
j 6=i
DAj =
K
α
(y2Ai − y
1
Ai
) , i = 1, . . . ,K , (4.17)
where DAi denotes the Ai-component of ∇1LP (y
1, x)−∇1LP (y
2, x). A similar set of conditions
hold for the B-components of ∇1LP (y
1, x)−∇1LP (y
2, x).
We now note that (4.17) is a system of linear equations on DAi , i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, with rank
K − 1 which admits a solution if and only if
K∑
i=1
y2Ai − y
1
Ai
= 0 .
Since y1A and y
1
A both belong to ∆
K , the previous equality is automatically satisfied. Without
loss of generality, we can solve (4.17) for DA1 , . . . ,DAK−1 with respect to y
1, y2 and DAK
obtaining
DAi =
2
α
(y2Ai − y
1
Ai
) +
1
α
∑
j 6=i
(y2Aj − y
1
Aj
) +DAK , i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} .
Recalling that y1A, y
2
A ∈ ∆
K , we can rewrite the previous set of equalities as
DAi −DAK =
1
α
(y2Ai − y
1
Ai
) , i ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} ,
which contradicts the fact that ∇1LP (y
1, x) − ∇1LP (y
2, x) does not depend on α. Thus, we
must have that y1 = y2, concluding the proof. 
Lemma 4.8. Let ψA, ψB and Φ be strictly convex functions with Lipschitz continuous deriva-
tives. Assume that the conditions of lemma 3.4 hold. Then:
(i) the functional LP (see (4.1)) has Lipschitz continuous partial derivatives;
(ii) there exists α0 > 0 such that for every 0 < α < min{1, α0} the map F : D → D implicitly
defined by
F (x) = (1− α)x+ αΠD[x−∇1LP (F (x), x)] (4.18)
is Lipschitz continuous.
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Proof. Item (i) follows from the assumptions regarding Lipschitz continuity of the derivatives of
ψA, ψB and Φ, together with lemma 3.4.
We will now prove item (ii). By lemma 4.7, the map F determined by (4.18) is well defined.
Let x1, x2 ∈ D be arbitrary and let ‖·‖ denote the Euclidean norm. To avoid making the notation
cumbersome, we do not distinguish between Euclidean norms in spaces of different dimensions,
since this should be clear to the reader.
Using (4.18) we obtain the estimate∥∥F (x2)− F (x1)∥∥ ≤ (1− α)∥∥x2 − x1∥∥
+α
∥∥ΠD[x2 −∇1LP (F (x2), x2)]−ΠD[x1 −∇1LP (F (x1), x1)]∥∥
Since ΠD is a contraction, we get∥∥F (x2)− F (x1)∥∥ ≤ (1− α)∥∥x2 − x1∥∥
+α
∥∥(x2 − x1)− (∇1LP (F (x2), x2)−∇1LP (F (x1), x1))∥∥
By the triangle inequality, we arrive at∥∥F (x2)− F (x1)∥∥ ≤ ∥∥x2 − x1∥∥+ α ∥∥∇1LP (F (x2), x2)−∇1LP (F (x1), x1)∥∥
Using item (i) of the present lemma, we get that there exists L > 0 such that∥∥F (x2)− F (x1)∥∥ ≤ (1 + αL)∥∥x2 − x1∥∥+ αL ∥∥F (x2)− F (x1)∥∥
Thus, for every α < min{1, L−1} we have that
∥∥F (x2)− F (x1)∥∥ ≤ 1 + αL
1− αL
∥∥x2 − x1∥∥ ,
concluding the proof. 
The next result follows from the stability theory for discrete-time projected dynamical systems
developed above.
Theorem 4.9. Assume Lipschitz continuity of the functions U ′β , ψ
′
β,Φ
′, β = A,B. Let the
agents initial beliefs Qβ(0) ∈ ∆
K be such that P (rA, QA(0)) > P (rB , QB(0)) for levels of risk
rβ ∈ Rβ ⊆ R
+
0 and fixed wealths wβ ∈ R, β = A,B.
Then, for every ǫ > 0 there exists α0 := α0(ǫ) > 0 such that for every 0 < α < min{1, α0} ev-
ery forward orbit of the projected gradient scheme (4.3) converges to some fixed point (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈
int(D). Moreover, every fixed point (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ int(D) is such that
PB(rB , Q
∗
B)− PA(rA, Q
∗
A) = 0
and (Q∗A, Q
∗
B , Q
∗
A, Q
∗
B) ∈ (D)
2 is a minimizer of the functional LP (see (4.1)).
Proof. Since the agents initial beliefs QA(0), QB(0) ∈ ∆
K are such that
P (rA, QA(0)) > P (rB , QB(0)) ,
then equality (3.2) holds and by lemma 3.3 (see remark (iii) following the lemma) we must
have that the agents levels of risk are such that rA ∈ RA and rB ∈ RB , where RA and RB are
bounded above. Recalling that UA and UB satisfy the usual Inada conditions with the extra
requirement that UA and UB have Lipschitz continuous derivatives, then lemma 3.4 guarantees
that the reservation price functions PA and PB have Lipschitz continuous partial derivatives on
a open neighborhood of R+0 ×∆
K . Finally, noticing that ψA, ψB and Φ are also assumed to be
strictly convex functions with Lipschitz continuous derivatives, we obtain that the first part of
the statement follows from lemmas 4.7 and 4.8, and theorem 4.5.
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For the second part of the statement, note that if x∗ = (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ int(D) is a fixed point
of the projected gradient scheme (4.3), then ∇1LP (x
∗, x∗) = 0 by proposition 4.4. From the
definition of the functional LP in (4.3), we get that (Q
∗
A, Q
∗
B) ∈ int(D) must satisfy the equalities
Φ′ (PB(rB , Q
∗
B)− PA(rA, Q
∗
A))∇QAPA(rA, Q
∗
A) = 0
Φ′ (PB(rB , Q
∗
B)− PA(rA, Q
∗
A))∇QBPB(rB , Q
∗
B) = 0 ,
where ∇QAPA and ∇QBPB denote, respectively, the gradient vectors of PA and PB with respect
to QA and QB . Since the contingent claim F is assumed to be non-constant, we obtain from
lemma 3.2 that such gradient vectors must be non-zero and the equalities above reduce to the
single equality PB(rB , Q
∗
B) − PA(rA, Q
∗
A) = 0. Since we assume that QA(0), QB(0) ∈ ∆
K are
such that P (rA, QA(0)) > P (rB , QB(0)) then inequality (3.2) must hold and thus, by lemma 3.3,
the equality above has a solution (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D. We conclude the proof by noting that under
the assumptions on the functions Φ, ψA and ψB , the functional LP is bounded below by zero
and that every point (Q∗A, Q
∗
B , Q
∗
A, Q
∗
B) ∈ (D)
2 such that PB(rB , Q
∗
B)−PA(rA, Q
∗
A) = 0 realizes
the (global) minimum of LP . 
Concerning the previous theorem, we remark that under the assumptions of theorem 4.9, the
asymptotic beliefs (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D determining the price P
∗ = PB(rB , Q
∗
B) = PA(rA, Q
∗
A) at
which the contingent claim F will eventually be traded depend very strongly on the the agents
initial beliefs (QA(0), QB(0)) ∈ D and rather weakly on the remaining model parameters. This
undesirable behavior is due to the form of the penalty function.
4.4. Bargaining dynamics for a λ-dependent penalty function. We will now introduce
a discrete-time projected gradient system which preserves all the desired properties of (4.3)
described above, but has several interesting additional properties. Our motivation for the in-
troduction of yet another projected gradient system is based on the observation that the fixed
points (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D of (4.3) yielding a unique price for the contingent claim F depend rather
weakly on the relative bargaining power of the two agents λ and remaining parameters, and that
such dependence becomes weaker with smaller (positive) values of ǫ. Clearly, such behavior is
due to the fact that the penalty term does not depend explicitly on λ. The bargaining dynamics
described below are based on a a penalty term depending on both λ and the previous period
prices.
Keeping the notation x(t) = (QA(t), QB(t)) ∈ D we define the functional L
λ
P : (D)
2 → R by
LλP (x(t+ 1), x(t)) := λψA(QA(t+ 1), QA(t)) + (1− λ)ψB(QB(t+ 1), QB(t))
+
1
ǫ
Φ [PB(rB , QB(t+ 1)) − λPA(rA, QA(t))− (1− λ)PB(rB , QB(t))] (4.19)
+
1
ǫ
Φ [λPA(rA, QA(t)) + (1− λ)PB(rB , QB(t))− PA(rA, QA(t+ 1))] ,
where Φ : R → R is a strictly convex continuously differentiable function with a (global) mini-
mum Φ(0) and ǫ is a small parameter measuring the size of the penalty terms.
As in the case of (4.3), we define a projected dynamical system on D by
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + α
(
ΠD
[
x(t)−∇x(t+1)L
λ
P (x(t+ 1), x(t))
]
− x(t)
)
, (4.20)
where ∇x(t+1)L
λ
P (x(t + 1), x(t)) ∈ R
2K denotes the gradient of LλP with respect to the variable
x(t+ 1) and ΠD : R
2K → D is the projection operator onto D defined in (4.4).
Lemma 4.10. For every λ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that LP (x(t+1), x(t)) ≤ L
λ
P (x(t+1), x(t)) and thus,
a global minimum (x∗, x∗) ∈ D of LλP is also a global minimum of LP .
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Proof. If PA(rA, QA(t + 1)) 6= PA(rA, QA(t)) or PB(rB , QB(t+ 1)) 6= PB(rB , QB(t)), the quan-
tities
PB(rB , QB(t+ 1))− λPA(rA, QA(t))− (1− λ)PB(rB , QB(t))
and
λPA(rA, QA(t)) + (1− λ)PB(rB , QB(t))− PA(rA, QA(t+ 1))
have opposite signs for every 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Since Φ is strictly convex with a minimum Φ(0), we
obtain that
Φ [PB(rB , QB(t+ 1))− PA(rA, QA(t+ 1))] ≤
1
ǫ
Φ [PB(rB , QB(t+ 1))− λPA(rA, QA(t))− (1− λ)PB(rB , QB(t))]
+
1
ǫ
Φ [λPA(rA, QA(t)) + (1− λ)PB(rB , QB(t))− PA(rA, QA(t+ 1))] .
Therefore, we obtain that
LP (x(t+ 1), x(t)) ≤ L
λ
P (x(t+ 1), x(t))
and thus, a global minimum (x∗, x∗) ∈ D of LλP is also a global minimum of LP . 
The next result is the analogue of lemmas (4.7) and (4.8) for the dynamical system (4.20).
We skip its proof, since this is identical to those of lemmas (4.7) and (4.8).
Lemma 4.11. Let U ′β , ψ
′
β,Φ
′ be Lipschitz continuous and assume that rβ ∈ Rβ where Rβ is a
bounded subset of R+0 . Then,
(i) The discrete-time dynamical system defined implicitly by (4.20) is well posed4.
(ii) the functional LλP has Lipschitz continuous partial derivatives;
(iii) there exists α0 > 0 such that for every 0 < α < min{1, α0} the map F : D → D implicitly
defined by F (x) := (1− α)x+ αΠD[x−∇1L
λ
P (F (x), x)] is Lipschitz continuous.
The following result provides conditions under which the dynamical system (4.20) converges
to a fixed point yielding: (i) a unique price for the contingent claim to be traded, and (ii) a
global minimum of LλP and LP .
Theorem 4.12. Assume Lipschitz continuity of the functions U ′β, ψ
′
β ,Φ
′, β = A,B. Let the
agents initial beliefs Qβ(0) ∈ ∆
K be such that P (rA, QA(0)) > P (rB , QB(0)) for levels of risk
rβ ∈ Rβ ⊆ R
+
0 and fixed wealths wβ ∈ R, β = A,B.
Then, for every ǫ > 0 there exists α0 := α0(ǫ) > 0 such that for every 0 < α < min{1, α0} ev-
ery forward orbit of the projected gradient scheme (4.20) converges to some fixed point (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈
int(D). Moreover, every fixed point (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ int(D) is such that
PB(rB , Q
∗
B)− PA(rA, Q
∗
A) = 0
and (Q∗A, Q
∗
B , Q
∗
A, Q
∗
B) ∈ (D)
2 is a minimizer of both LP (given in (4.1)) and L
λ
P (given in
(4.19)).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of theorem 4.9, so we skip most details.
If x∗ = (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ int(D) is a fixed point of the projected gradient scheme (4.20), then
∇1L
λ
P (x
∗, x∗) = 0 by proposition 4.4. From the definition of the functional LλP in (4.20), we get
that (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ int(D) must satisfy the equalities
Φ′ (λPA(rA, Q
∗
A) + (1− λ)PB(rB , Q
∗
B)− PA(rA, Q
∗
A))∇QAPA(rA, Q
∗
A) = 0
Φ′ (PB(rB , Q
∗
B)− λPA(rA, Q
∗
A)− (1− λ)PB(rB , Q
∗
B))∇QBPB(rB , Q
∗
B) = 0 ,
4 i.e. to every x0 ∈ D corresponds a unique forward trajectory (xn)n∈N such that for every n ∈ N the pair
(xn, xn−1) satisfies the recurrence (4.20).
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where ∇QAPA and ∇QBPB denote, respectively, the gradient vectors of PA and PB with respect
to QA and QB . Since the contingent claim F is assumed to be non-constant, we obtain from
lemma 3.2 that such gradient vectors must be non-zero and the equalities above reduce to
PA(rA, Q
∗
A) = λPA(rA, Q
∗
A) + (1− λ)PB(rB , Q
∗
B) = PB(rB , Q
∗
B) .
From the set of equalities above, we conclude that (Q∗A, Q
∗
B , Q
∗
A, Q
∗
B) ∈ (D)
2 is a minimizer of
both functionals LP and L
λ
P . 
We will assume that the conditions of theorem 4.12 are satisfied for the remaining of this
section. Let ∆+ denote the set
∆+ =
{
(Q0A, Q
0
B) ∈ D : PA(rA, Q
0
A) ≥ PB(rB , Q
0
B)
}
,
and let E denote the set
E = ∆+ ×RA ×RB × [0, 1]
where RA and RB are the bounded sets of lemma 3.3 (see remark (iii) following this lemma).
We define the asymptotic price function P ∗ : E → R by
P ∗(Q0A, Q
0
B , rA, rB , λ) = lim
t→∞
PA(rA, QA(t)) = PA(rA, Q
∗
A) , (4.21)
where {QA(t), QB(t)}t∈N is the forward orbit of (4.20) with initial condition (Q
0
A, Q
0
B) ∈ ∆
+
and fixed parameters rA, rB and λ. Theorem 4.12 ensures that P
∗ is well defined by (4.21).
Moreover, theorem 4.12 provides the following alternative representation for P ∗, which will turn
out to be useful below
P ∗(Q0A, Q
0
B , rA, rB , λ) = lim
t→∞
PB(rB , QB(t)) = PB(rB , Q
∗
B) . (4.22)
The three results below describe the dependence of the asymptotic price function P ∗ with
respect to the agents initial beliefs (Q0A, Q
0
B) ∈ ∆
+, levels of risk rA ∈ RA, rB ∈ RB and relative
bargaining power λ ∈ [0, 1].
Corollary 4.13. Under the assumptions of theorem 4.12, the asymptotic price function P ∗ is
continuous on E.
Proof. Follows from theorem 4.12, the asymptotic price representations (4.21) and (4.22), conti-
nuity of the agents reservation price functions PA and PB with respect to (rA, QA) ∈ RA ×∆
K
and (rB , QB) ∈ RB × ∆
K , respectively, and continuity of the map F of item (iii) in lemma
4.11. 
Corollary 4.14. Assume that the conditions of theorem 4.12 hold. Fix the agents initial beliefs
(Q0A, Q
0
B) ∈ ∆
+ and levels of risk rA ∈ RA and rB ∈ RB. Let P
∗(λ) denote the asymptotic price
function as a function of the agents relative bargaining power λ. The following statements hold:
(i) P ∗(λ) is an increasing function of the relative bargaining power of the two agents λ;
(ii) if λ = 0 then QB(t) = QB(t+ 1) for every t ∈ N and P
∗(λ) = PB(rB , QB(0));
(iii) if λ = 1 then QA(t) = QA(t+ 1) for every t ∈ N and P
∗(λ) = PA(rA, QA(0)).
Proof. Follows from theorem 4.12 and the form of the penalty term in (4.19) and (4.20). 
Corollary 4.15. Assume that the conditions of theorem 4.12 hold. Fix the agents initial beliefs
(Q0A, Q
0
B) ∈ ∆
+ and relative bargaining power λ. Let P ∗(rA, rB) denote the asymptotic price
function as a function of the agents levels of risk rA ∈ RA and rB ∈ RB. The following
statements hold:
(i) for fixed values of rB, P
∗(rA, rB) is a decreasing function of rA;
(ii) for fixed values of rA, P
∗(rA, rB) is a decreasing function of rB.
Proof. Follows from theorem 4.12, the asymptotic price representations (4.21) and (4.22) and
lemma 3.2. 
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5. The case of exponential utility functions
In this section we restrict our attention to the case where the two agents have exponential
utility functions
Uβ(w) =
1− exp(−λβw)
λβ
, β = A,B, (5.1)
where λβ ∈ R
+ are the agents risk aversion coefficients. It is clear that this class of utility
function satisfy the Inada conditions. Moreover, as λβ → 0 we recover the linear utility function
which corresponds to risk neutral agents. From (2.1) we obtain that the reservation prices for
agent β are given by
Pβ(rβ , Qβ) = ℓβ
1
λβ
ln
(
EQβ [exp(ℓβλβF )]
1 + λβrβ exp(λβwβ)
)
, β = A,B. (5.2)
Note that when we restrict our attention to this particular class of utility functions, the corre-
sponding price functions Pβ are much more regular than what is claimed in lemmas 3.2 and 3.4.
In this particular setup the price functions are C∞ functions of (rβ, Qβ) on an open neighborhood
of R+0 ×∆
K . Its partial derivatives are given by
∂Pβ
∂Qkβ
(rβ, Qβ) = ℓβ
1
λβ
(
exp(ℓβλβF [k])
EQβ [exp(ℓβλβF )]
−
exp(λβwβ)
1 + λβrβ exp(λβwβ)
)
,
where k = 1, . . . ,K, β = A,B and
∂Pβ
∂rβ
(rβ , Qβ) = −ℓβ
exp(λβwβ)
1 + λβrβ exp(λβwβ)
, β = A,B.
We remark that one must use lemma 3.2 to obtain properly defined partial derivatives of PA
and PB on a neighborhood of R
+ ×∆K . Since ∆K is a closed subset of RK , differentiation of
the explicit expression of the reservation prices PA and PB with respect to the agents beliefs
QA and QB, should either be avoided or an extension of PA and PB to a neighborhood of ∆
K
should be carefully chosen to preserve relations (2.1).
5.1. Beliefs optimization for fixed levels of risk. Due to the convexity properties of the
reservation prices PA and PB stated in lemma 3.1, theorem 3.5 ensures the existence of a unique
solution to the minimization problem (2.2) with fixed levels of risk rA and rB when the agents
make their decisions using the exponential utility functions UA and UB in (5.1). Figure 1 provides
some geometric intuition for the solution of such minimization problem when the number of
states of the world is K = 2. Given a contingency claim F on Ω and initial beliefs Q0A, Q
0
B ∈ ∆
K ,
the tangency point between the minimum level set of λψA(QA, Q
0
A)+(1−λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B) and the
manifold PA(rA, QA) = PB(rB , QB) determines the solution (Q
∗
A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D to the minimization
problem (2.2) for fixed levels of risk rA and rB , wealths wA and wB , and relative bargaining
power λ.
For values of the initial beliefs Q0A, Q
0
B ∈ ∆
K on the set
∆+ =
{
(Q0A, Q
0
B) ∈ D : PA(rA, Q
0
A) ≥ PB(rB , Q
0
B)
}
,
the minimum level set of the functional λψA(QA, Q
0
A) + (1 − λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B) will be contained
in ∆+ and thus, the optimal solution (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D contained on the manifold PA(rA, QA) =
PB(rA, QA) will depend continuously on the parameters λ, rA and rB , as well as on the initial
beliefs in ∆+.
The unique solution (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D determines then a unique price for the contingent claim.
As seen in Theorem 3.5, such unique optimal price is also a continuous function of the parameters
λ, rA and rB . Figures 2, 3 and 4 illustrate this behavior. A few remarks about these figures
seem to be appropriate now.
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Figure 1. The optimal solution for the minimization problem (2.2). The hori-
zontal axis represents the first component of agent A beliefs’ QA = (Q
1
A, Q
2
A) ∈
∆2, while the vertical axis represents the first component of agent B beliefs’
QB = (Q
1
B, Q
2
B) ∈ ∆
2. The first components of the optimal solution are denoted
as Q∗A and Q
∗
B. This figure is based on a numerical simulation with the following
values of parameters: K = 2, F = (1, 2), wA = wB = 0, rA = 0.4, and rB = 0.3.
The strictly convex “distance functions” used are ψA(QA, Q
0
A) =
∥∥QA −Q0A∥∥2 /2
and ψB(QB , Q
0
B) =
∥∥QB −Q0B∥∥2 /2, and the relative bargaining power of the
two agents is λ = 0.4. The agents utility functions are of the form (5.1) with
λA = 2 and λB = 1. The initial agents beliefs are Q
0
A = (0.25, 0.75) and Q
0
B =
(0.75, 0.25).
In what concerns the dependence of the optimal price P ∗ on the relative bargaining power of
the two agents λ in Fig. 2, we have that P ∗ is an increasing function of λ. This is consistent with
the fact that as λ increases, so does the bargaining power of the seller of the contingent claim,
thus increasing the value of the optimal price P ∗. Note also that λ measures the “eccentricity”
of the level sets of the functional λψA(QA, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B) in Fig. 1.
In what concerns the dependence of the optimal price function P ∗ on the agents levels of risk
rA and rB , we first recall that its domain of definition is bounded by lemma 3.3 (see remark (iii)
following this lemma), with the upper bounds on rA and rB determined by condition (3.2). It is
particularly interesting to note that P ∗ is not a monotone function of rA for small values of rB
(see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4(a)). If agent B level of risk rB is sufficiently small, even though agent B
bargaining power is larger than agent A bargaining power, agent A is able to increase the value
of the optimal price P ∗ by taking positive values of risk up to a given amount, from where the
optimal price starts to decrease with agent A level of risk rA. For larger values of rB , P
∗ is a
strictly decreasing function of rA (see Figs. 3 and 4(b)) and P
∗ is always an increasing function
of rB for fixed values of rA (see Figs. 3, 4(c) and 4(d)).
We should remark that the typical situation is the one observed in Figs. 4(b), 4(c) and 4(d),
i.e. if all other parameters are kept fixed, P ∗ decreases with the level of risk of the seller of the
contingent claim and increases with the level of risk of the buyer of the contingent claim. The
behavior of Fig. 4(a) is observed only for a small set of suitably chosen parameters.
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Figure 2. The optimal price P ∗(λ) as a function of the relative bargaining power
of the two agents λ, obtained from the minimization problem (2.2). The values
of the remaining parameters are as in Fig. 1.
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Figure 3. The optimal price P ∗(rA, rB) as a function of the agents levels of risk
rA and rB , obtained from the minimization problem (2.2). The values of the
remaining parameters are as in Fig. 1.
5.2. The bargaining dynamics with exponential utility functions. We will now focus
our attention on the behavior of the projected dynamical systems (4.3) and (4.20) modeling
the bargaining process under which the two agents exchange beliefs and eventually agree on a
unique price to trade the contingent claim.
We start with projected dynamical systems (4.3). In Fig. 5 we plot the evolution of the two
agents reservation prices PA(t) and PB(t) determined by (5.2) evaluated along orbits
(QA(t), QB(t))t≥0
of (4.3) for three different values of the agents relative bargaining power λ. We note that even
though (4.3) achieves its primary goal of modeling an exchange of beliefs under which the agents
agree on a unique price for the contingent claim, we believe it to have several flaws, namely:
(i) the dynamics of (4.3) depend very weakly on the agents relative bargaining power λ,
which can immediately be seen from a comparison of Figs. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c);
(ii) the reservation price of the seller is not necessarily a decreasing function of time t;
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Figure 4. Sections of the three-dimensional graph of P ∗(rA, rB) in Fig. 3. The
figures on the top are plots of the optimal price P ∗(rA) as a function of agent A
level of risk rA when agent B level of risk is fixed at rB = 0 (left) and rB = 0.2
(right). The figures on the bottom are plots of the optimal price P ∗(rB) as a
function of agent B level of risk rB when agent A level of risk is fixed at rA = 0
(left) and rA = 0.2 (right).
(iii) the reservation price of the buyer is not necessarily an increasing function of time t;
(iv) the asymptotic price does not need to lie on the interval bounded by PA(0) and PB(0);
(v) for extreme values of the agents relative bargaining power λ = 0 and λ = 1, the functions
PB(t) and PA(t) do not need to be constant with t.
The main reason for the projected gradient system (4.3) to have the qualitative behavior de-
scribed in items (i)-(v) above is the lack of dependence of the penalty function in (4.1) on the
the agents relative bargaining power λ, as well as the agents reservation prices at the previous
period of time.
As described in section 4.4, the introduction of the projected gradient system (4.20) addresses
the problems of (4.3) listed in items (i)-(v) above. Therefore, we believe that (4.20) may be a
particularly good dynamical model for the bargaining process modeling the exchange of beliefs
between two agents who are willing to trade a given asset. In particular, the introduction of
(4.20) provides us with a dynamical system that, under the reasonable assumptions of theorem
4.12, satisfies the following properties:
1) the asymptotic price P ∗ is such that the inequalities PB(0) ≤ P
∗ ≤ PA(0) (see Fig. 6);
2) the asymptotic price P ∗ increases with λ (see Fig. 6);
3) if λ = 0 then PB(t) is constant in t ∈ Z and P
∗ = PB(rB , QB(0)) (see Fig. 6(a));
4) if λ = 1 then PA(t) is constant in t ∈ Z and P
∗ = PA(rA, QA(0)) (see Fig. 6(b));
5) all other parameters being fixed, the asymptotic price P ∗ is a decreasing function of rA;
6) all other parameters being fixed, the asymptotic price P ∗ is an increasing function of rB;
7) PA(t) is a decreasing function of t and PB(t) is an increasing function of t (see Fig. 6).
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Figure 5. The reservation price functions of both agents computed along orbits
of the projected gradient system (4.3) modeling the bargaining process for dif-
ferent values of the relative bargaining power of the two agents λ: λ = 0 on the
top left, λ = 1 on the top right, and λ = 0.4 on the bottom. For all three figures
ǫ = 0.1 and α = 0.05. The remaining values of parameters are as in Fig. 1.
6. Conclusion
We have described a class of dynamical systems modeling a “bargaining period” in which
the buyer and the seller of a contingent claim, whose real value depends on the future state of
the economy, agree on a common price for its transaction. Such dynamical systems model the
evolution with time of the agents’ beliefs about the future states of the world, i.e. probability
measures representing each agent estimate for the occurrence of each possible state of the world.
Moreover, this class of dynamical systems has the form of a discrete-time gradient dynamical
system, which is related to the minimization problem of the joint belief deviation function. Our
gradient dynamical system is shown to converge to a common price for the asset under mild
assumptions.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. (1) We prove the statement for the price function of agent A, the proof for agent B being
similar. Recall that the expected utility function of agent A for the contingent claim F , which
we will denote by UA, is given by
UA(x) = EQA [UA(wA + x− F )] =
K∑
k=1
QkAUA(wA + x− F [k]) ,
where QA = (Q
1
A, . . . , Q
K
A ) ∈ ∆
K . Since UA(wA+x−F [k]) is a strictly increasing concave func-
tion of x for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we get that so is UA(x), being a (convex) linear combination
of such functions. Thus, the expected utility UA is invertible. Therefore, the reservation price
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Figure 6. The reservation price functions of both agents computed along orbits
of the projected gradient system (4.20) modeling the bargaining process for dif-
ferent values of the relative bargaining power of the two agents λ: λ = 0 on the
top left, λ = 1 on the top right, and λ = 0.4 on the bottom. For all three figures
ǫ = 0.1 and α = 0.05. The remaining values of parameters are as in Fig. 1.
PA of agent A is well-defined as the (unique) solution of the equality
U(wA)− rA = UA(PA(QA)) , (A.1)
for each (rA, QA) ∈ R
+
0 ×∆
K .
(2) We will only prove the case β = A, the proof of the case β = B being similar. Let
QA ∈ ∆
K be fixed, and let r1A, r
2
A ∈ R
+
0 and 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. To make the notation lighter, we
introduce the following definitions
P 1A := PA(r
1
A) , P
2
A := PA(r
2
A) , P
ν
A := PA(νr
1
A + (1− ν)r
2
A) .
From (2.1) we obtain that
UA(wA)− r
i
A = EQA
[
UA(wA + P
i
A − F )
]
, i = 1, 2
UA(wA)− νr
1
A − (1− ν)r
2
A = EQA [UA(wA + P
ν
A − F )] .
Using the equalities above and the expected value linearity, we get that
EQA [UA(wA + P
ν
A − F )] = EQA
[
νUA(wA + P
1
A − F ) + (1− ν)UA(wA + P
2
A − F )
]
.
Since the equality above is satisfied for every QA ∈ ∆
K , we obtain that
UA(wA + P
ν
A − F ) = νUA(wA + P
1
A − F ) + (1− ν)UA(wA + P
2
A − F ) . (A.2)
Since UA is a concave function, we get the inequality
νUA(wA + P
1
A − F ) + (1 − ν)UA(wA + P
2
A − F )
≤ UA(ν(wA + P
1
A − F ) + (1− ν)(wA + P
2
A − F )) (A.3)
= UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A − F ) .
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Putting together conditions (A.2) and (A.3), we obtain that
UA(wA + P
ν
A − F ) ≤ UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A − F ) .
Recalling that UA has positive first derivative, from the previous inequality we get
P νA ≤ νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A ,
which concludes the proof of convexity of agent’s A price function PA with respect to its level
of risk rA.
(3) We will prove item (i), the proof of item (ii) being similar. We let rA ∈ R
+
0 be fixed,
Q1A, Q
2
A ∈ ∆
K and 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. We introduce the following simplification to the notation
P 1A = PA(Q
1
A) , P
2
A = PA(Q
2
A) , P
ν
A = PA(νQ
1
A + (1− ν)Q
2
A) .
From equality (2.1) we get that
UA(wA)− rA = EQi
A
[
UA(wA + P
i
A − F )
]
, i = 1, 2
UA(wA)− rA = EνQ1
A
+(1−ν)Q2
A
[UA(wA + P
ν
A − F )] .
From the equalities above, we immediately obtain that
EνQ1
A
+(1−ν)Q2
A
[UA(wA + P
ν
A − F )]
= νEQ1
A
[
UA(wA + P
1
A − F )
]
+ (1− ν)EQ2
A
[
UA(wA + P
2
A − F )
]
which is clearly equivalent to
EνQ1
A
+(1−ν)Q2
A
[UA(wA + P
ν
A − F )]
= EνQ1
A
+(1−ν)Q2
A
[
UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A − F )
]
+GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν) , (A.4)
where GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(λ) is given by
GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν) = νEQ1
A
[
UA(wA + P
1
A − F )
]
+ (1− ν)EQ2
A
[
UA(wA + P
2
A − F )
]
−EνQ1
A
+(1−ν)Q2
A
[
UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A − F )
]
.
Assume for a moment that GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν) is non-negative for every Q1, Q2 ∈ ∆
K and every ν ∈ [0, 1].
Then, we obtain from (A.4) that
EνQ1
A
+(1−ν)Q2
A
[UA(wA + P
ν
A − F )]
≥ EνQ1
A
+(1−ν)Q2
A
[
UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A − F )
]
Since the previous inequality holds for arbitrary measures Q1A and Q
2
A, we get that
UA(wA + P
ν
A − F ) ≥ UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A − F )
and by monotonicity of the utility function UA we obtain from the previous inequality that
P νA ≥ νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A ,
thus proving concavity of the seller price function PA.
We will now see that GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν) is non-negative for every Q1, Q2 ∈ ∆
K and ν ∈ [0, 1]. We
first note that if P 1A = P
2
A, then GQ1A,Q
2
A
(ν) is identically zero. It remains to see that GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν)
is non-negative provided P 1A 6= P
2
A. Without loss of generality, we assume that P
1
A > P
2
A.
Rearranging terms, we write GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν) as
GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν) = νEQ1
A
[
UA(wA + P
1
A − F )− UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A − F )
]
(A.5)
+(1− ν)EQ2
A
[
UA(wA + P
2
A − F )− UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A − F )
]
.
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Since UA is differentiable, we obtain that there exists C1 ∈ (νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A, P
1
A) such that
UA(wA+P
1
A−F )−UA(wA+νP
1
A+(1−ν)P
2
A−F ) = (1−ν)(P
1
A−P
2
A)U
′
A(wA+C1−F ) . (A.6)
Similarly, there exists C2 ∈ (P
2
A, νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A) such that
UA(wA +P
2
A −F )−UA(wA + νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A −F ) = −ν(P
1
A −P
2
A)U
′
A(wA +C2 − F ) . (A.7)
Substituting (A.6) and (A.7) in (A.5), we get
GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν) = ν(1− ν)(P 1A − P
2
A)
×
(
EQ1
A
[
U ′A(wA + C1 − F )
]
− EQ2
A
[
U ′A(wA + C2 − F )
])
. (A.8)
Recalling that UA is increasing, we obtain that for every C1 ∈ (νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A, P
1
A) we have
EQ1
A
[
UA(wA + C
1 − F )
]
< EQ1
A
[
UA(wA + P
1
A − F )
]
= UA(wA)− rA , (A.9)
and for every C2 ∈ (P
2
A, νP
1
A + (1− ν)P
2
A) we have
EQ2
A
[
UA(wA + C
2 − F )
]
> EQ2
A
[
UA(wA + P
2
A − F )
]
= UA(wA)− rA . (A.10)
Combining concavity of UA with (A.9) and (A.10), we obtain the inequality
EQ1
A
[
U ′A(wA +C
1 − F )
]
> EQ2
A
[
U ′A(wA + C
2 − F )
]
,
which, combined with (A.8), guarantees that GQ1
A
,Q2
A
(ν) is non-negative. 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. Since Ω is a finite set and the contingent claim F is non-constant, we have that
min
ω∈Ω
F [ω] ≤ F [ω] ≤ max
ω∈Ω
F [ω] , ω ∈ Ω .
From the previous inequalities and strict monotonicity of the utility function UA, we obtain that
for every ω ∈ Ω
UA
(
wA + PA −max
ω∈Ω
F [ω]
)
≤ UA (wA + PA − F [ω]) ≤ UA
(
wA + PA −min
ω∈Ω
F [ω]
)
,
and thus
UA
(
wA + PA −max
ω∈Ω
F [ω]
)
≤ EQA [U (wA + PA − F )] ≤ UA
(
wA + PA −min
ω∈Ω
F [ω]
)
. (B.1)
Recalling the definition of agent A reservation price, we get that
UA(wA)− rA = EQA [U (wA + PA − F )] . (B.2)
Combining (B.1) and (B.2), we obtain
UA
(
wA + PA −max
ω∈Ω
F [ω]
)
≤ UA(wA)− rA ≤ UA
(
wA + PA −min
ω∈Ω
F [ω]
)
.
Solving the previous inequalities with respect to PA, we get the first set of inequalities in the
statement. Clearly, one can obtain the second set of inequalities from an analogous computation.
We now prove the second part of the lemma. Using the bounds for the reservation prices PA
and PB on the first part of the statement, we obtain that
D− ≤ PB − PA ≤ D
+ ,
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where
D+ = G(wA, wB , rA, rB) + max
ω∈Ω
F [ω]−min
ω∈Ω
F [ω]
D− = G(wA, wB , rA, rB)−
(
max
ω∈Ω
F [ω]−min
ω∈Ω
F [ω]
)
and
G(wA, wB , rA, rB) = wB − U
−1
B (UB(wB)− rB) + wA − U
−1
A (UA(wA)− rA) .
Since the risk levels rA and rB are assumed to be strictly positive and F is non-constant, we
trivially get the following inequalities
wi − U
−1
i (Ui(wi)− ri) ≥ 0 , i = A,B
max
ω∈Ω
F [ω]−min
ω∈Ω
F [ω] > 0 .
Using the previous inequalities it is clear that D+ is strictly positive and that D− is negative if
and only if
max
ω∈Ω
F [ω]−min
ω∈Ω
F [ω] > wB − U
−1
B (UB(wB)− rB) +wA − U
−1
A (UA(wA)− rA) ,
as required. 
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof. We will prove that the partial derivatives of PA with respect to the components of QA
are Lipschitz continuous, the remaining proofs being analogous or easier, such as for the case of
the partial derivatives with respect to rA and rB).
By lemma 3.2 we have that PA is a continuously differentiable function of (rA, QA) and that
its partial derivatives with respect to the components of QA are given by
∂PA
∂QkA
(rA, QA) = −
UA(wA + PA − F [k])
EQA [U
′
A(wA + PA − F )]
, k = 1, . . . ,K .
Fix k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and rA ∈ RA, and let Q1, Q2 be arbitrary elements of ∆
K . We have that∣∣∣∣ ∂PA∂QkA (Q1)−
∂PA
∂QkA
(Q2)
∣∣∣∣ =∣∣∣∣ UA(wA + PA(Q1)− F [k])EQ1 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )] −
UA(wA + PA(Q2)− F [k])
EQ2 [U
′
A(wA + PA(Q2)− F )]
∣∣∣∣ ,
where we have dropped the dependence of the partial derivatives on rA to simplify notation.
Let us introduce the quantities
D = UA(wA + PA(Q1)− F [k])EQ2 [U
′
A(wA + PA(Q2)− F )]
−UA(wA + PA(Q2)− F [k])EQ1 [U
′
A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]
N = EQ1 [U
′
A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]EQ2 [U
′
A(wA + PA(Q2)− F )]
Clearly, we have that ∣∣∣∣ ∂PA∂QkA (Q1)−
∂PA
∂QkA
(Q2)
∣∣∣∣ = |D||N | .
By lemma 3.3, we get that
U−1A (UA(wA)− rA)−∆[F ] ≤ wA + PA − F ≤ U
−1
A (UA(wA)− rA) + ∆[F ] (C.1)
where ∆[F ] is defined as
∆[F ] = max
ω∈Ω
F [ω]−min
ω∈Ω
F [ω] .
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Since ∆[F ] is such that 0 < ∆[F ] < ∞, wA is fixed and RA is bounded, we obtain that
wA+PA−F is bounded above. As a consequence U
′
A(wA+PA−F ) is bounded away from zero
and we obtain that there exists M1 > 0 such that |N | > M1.
We will now prove that there exists M2 > 0 such that D ≤M2 ‖Q1 −Q2‖, where ‖·‖ denotes
the Euclidean norm in RK . We start by rewriting D as
D = UA(wA + PA(Q1)− F [k])
×
(
EQ2 [U
′
A(wA + PA(Q2)− F )]− EQ1 [U
′
A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]
)
+(UA(wA + PA(Q1)− F [k]) − UA(wA + PA(Q2)− F [k]))
×EQ1 [U
′
A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )] .
Since UA(wA + PA(Q1)− F [k]) is a continuous function of Q1 ∈ ∆
K and ∆K is a compact set,
we obtain that |UA(wA + PA(Q1) − F [k])| is bounded above. Moreover, using the inequalities
(C.1), we obtain that |EQ1 [U
′
A(wA +PA(Q)−F )]| is also bounded above. Recall that UA(wA +
PA(Q)−F [k]) is continuously differentiable with respect to Q to obtain the existence of C1 > 0
such that
|UA(wA + PA(Q1)− F [k])− UA(wA + PA(Q2)− F [k])| ≤ C1 ‖Q1 −Q2‖ .
We now note that∣∣EQ2 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q2)− F )]− EQ1 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]∣∣ ≤∣∣EQ2 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q2)− F )− U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]∣∣
+
∣∣EQ2 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]− EQ1 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]∣∣
Since PA is continuously differentiable and we are assuming that U
′
A is Lipschitz continuous, we
obtain that there exists C2 > 0 such that∣∣EQ2 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q2)− F )− U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]∣∣ ≤ C2 ‖Q1 −Q2‖ .
Moreover, we get that ∣∣EQ2 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]− EQ1 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
(QK2 −Q
K
1 )U
′
A(wA + PA(Q1)− F [k])
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
K∑
k=1
∣∣QK2 −QK1 ∣∣ ∣∣U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F [k])∣∣
Using the inequalities (C.1) once again, we obtain that U ′A(wA+PA(Q1)−F ) is bounded above.
Thus, there exists C3 > 0 such that∣∣EQ2 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]− EQ1 [U ′A(wA + PA(Q1)− F )]∣∣ ≤ C3 ‖Q1 −Q2‖ .
We conclude that there exists M2 > 0 such that |D| ≤M2 ‖Q1 −Q2‖. C
Combining this inequality with the bound obtained previously for |N |, we get the desired
result. 
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 3.5
Proof. Let us fix λ ∈ (0, 1), rA, rB ∈ R
+
0 , wA, wB ∈ R and Q
0
A, Q
0
B ∈ ∆
K such that P (rA, Q
0
A) >
P (rB , Q
0
B), and consider the minimization problem (2.2).
Note that ψA(QA, Q
0
A) is a convex function of QA and ψB(QB, Q
0
B) is a convex function of
QB . Thus, the function to be minimized
λψA(QA, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B)
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being a convex combination of convex functions, is also convex. Using lemma 3.1, we get that
for fixed levels of risk rA and rB , the seller price function PA is a concave function of QA and the
buyer price function PB is a convex function of QB . Thus, we obtain that PB(QB)−PA(QA) is
a convex function of (QA, QB) ∈ D and that
{(QA, QB) ∈ D : PB(QB) ≥ PA(QA)}
is a convex subset of D. From the convexity of the function to be minimized and the convexity
of the constraint set, we obtain that the minimization problem (2.2) has a unique solution which
is attained at (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D.
Using lemma 3.2 we obtain that the price functions PA and PB are differentiable with respect
to QA and QB , respectively. One can then use the Lagrange multiplier method to solve (2.2).
Define the Lagrangian function LrA,rB,λ : D×R
+ → R associated with the minimization problem
(2.2) as
LrA,rB,λ(QA, QB , µ) = λψA(QA, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)ψB(QB , Q
0
B)
+µ(PA(rA, QA)− PB(rB , QB)) ,
where rA and rB are fixed and µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
inequality PA(rA, QA) ≤ PB(rA, QB) in the minimization problem under consideration. We
then look for points (QA, QB , µ) ∈ D × R satisfying the following 2K + 1 equalities
∂LrA,rB,λ
∂QjA
(QA, QB , µ) = 0 , j = 1, . . . ,K
∂LrA,rB,λ
∂QjB
(QA, QB , µ) = 0 , j = 1, . . . ,K (D.1)
∂LrA,rB,λ
∂µ
(QA, QB , µ) = 0 .
Since we have already proved the existence of a solution (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ D for the minimization
problem (2.2), Kuhn-Tucker theorem implies the existence of µ∗ ∈ R such that (Q∗A, Q
∗
B , µ
∗) ∈
D × R is a solution of (D.1). In particular, from the last equation in (D.1) we must have that
PA(Q
∗
A) = PB(Q
∗
B) .
Since Q0A, Q
0
B ∈ ∆
K are such that P (rA, Q
0
A) > P (rB , Q
0
B), then inequality (3.2) holds and thus
the existence of a pair (Q∗A, Q
∗
B) ∈ ∆
K ×∆K satisfying the previous equality is guaranteed by
lemma 3.3.
The continuity of the solution of the optimization problem (2.2) with respect to λ, rA and rB
is a consequence of Berge’s maximum theorem [2, Ch. VI, Sec. 3], which guarantees continuity
of the minimal functional
λψA(Q
∗
A, Q
0
A) + (1− λ)ψB(Q
∗
B , Q
0
B)
with respect to rA, rB and λ and upper semicontinuity of the correspondence given by
(λ, rA, rB) 7→ (Q
∗
A(λ, rA, rB), Q
∗
B(λ, rA, rB)) . (D.2)
Since the solution of the problem is unique by theorem 3.5, we get that correspondence (D.2) is
single-valued and therefore continuous.

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